daniel sparks goldman sachs

daniel sparks goldman sachs

Les dirigeants de Goldman Sachs se sont efforcés mardi de se défendre devant une commission du Sénat américain qui l'accuse d'avoir participé à la formation de la bulle du marché immobilier et d'avoir engrangé des milliards de profits aux dépens de ses clients.

Au cours de cette audition, les responsables de la puissante banque d'affaires et d'investissement ont affirmé que celle-ci avait pratiqué de la gestion du risque classique et n'avait pas parié sur une baisse globale du marché immobilier.

Fabrice Tourre, le salarié français du groupe accusé d'avoir conçu le produit financier complexe au centre des poursuites engagées par la Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) contre la banque, a déclaré pour sa part qu'il n'avait dissimulé aucune information importante aux clients.

Lors d'un échange verbal tendu, le sénateur Carl Levin, qui préside les auditions, a demandé à Dan Sparks, ex-directeur de l'activité de crédit immobilier de Goldman Sachs, s'il avait ressenti le besoin d'informer ses clients lorsque la banque pariait contre leurs propres positions.

Il a fait allusion à une opération particulière que l'un des supérieurs de Dan Sparks avait lui-même qualifié de "merdeuse".

Dan Sparks n'a pas répondu directement sur ce point et précisé que l'adjectif ne correspondait pas à sa propre description de l'opération.

Dans un communiqué, la sous-commission a estimé que Goldman Sachs avait contribué à gonfler la bulle immobilière en concevant des produits obligataires regroupant des créances à risques entre 2004 et 2007, avant d'incorporer ces titres dans des produits complexes.

"DES CLIENTS CONSIDÉRÉS COMME DES SOURCES DE PROFIT"

Lorsque le marché immobilier s'est retourné, Goldman Sachs est devenu vendeur à découvert, pariant ainsi sur la baisse pendant toute l'année 2007, a ajouté la commission, qui reproche à la banque de ne pas avoir révélé ses positions à ses clients et d'avoir vendu à certains d'entre eux des titres dont elle souhaitait se débarrasser.

L'ancien candidat à la présidence John McCain, membre de la sous-commission, a reconnu ne pas savoir si Goldman Sachs avait agi illégalement mais il a ajouté n'avoir "aucun doute" sur le fait que la banque n'avait pas agi de manière éthique.

A la Bourse de New York, l'action Goldman Sachs gagnait 1,33% à 17h45 GMT dans un marché en nette baisse.

Les sénateurs ont concentré leurs attaques sur une transaction particulière, dans laquelle Goldman Sachs est accusé de ne pas avoir révélé des informations capitales aux investisseurs et à un analyste.

C'est ce même produit, dénommé Abacus 2007-AC1, qui vaut à la banque d'être accusée de fraude par la Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

"Le comportement de Goldman démontre qu'il a souvent considéré ses clients non pas comme des clients valables mais comme des sources de profit", a déclaré Carl Levin. "Son comportement remet en question le fonctionnement de Wall Street dans son ensemble."

Les dirigeants de Goldman Sachs se sont défendus en expliquant que la banque n'avait pas prédit l'évolution du marché immobilier mais qu'elle avait simplement pratiqué une gestion classique de ses risques.

"DES JUGEMENTS PARFOIS JUSTES ET PARFOIS FAUX"

Un vif débat a eu lieu en interne sur l'évolution du marché immobilier mais n'a abouti à aucune conclusion définitive, a expliqué le directeur financier, David Viniar.

Il a ajouté que la banque avait décidé de réduire son exposition et qu'elle avait cédé certaines positions à des investisseurs qui les jugeaient intéressantes.

"Comme nos jugements, leurs jugements se sont parfois révélés justes et parfois faux", a-t-il poursuivi.

Goldman Sachs n'a réalisé que des profits limités dans les crédits immobiliers résidentiels en 2007 et a perdu de l'argent sur ce marché en 2008, a-t-il précisé.

La SEC a engagé le 16 avril une procédure à l'encontre de Goldman Sachs et de Fabrice Tourre, en reprochant à la banque de ne pas avoir informé les investisseurs du fait qu'elle avait autorisé le gestionnaire de "hedge funds" Paulson & Co à choisir des titres incorporés dans le portefeuille d'Abacus en pariant sur leur dépréciation.

Paulson & Co est soupçonné d'avoir engrangé plus d'un milliard de dollars de plus-values grâce à cette opération, soit à peu près le montant global des pertes subies par les investisseurs ayant misé sur Abacus.

Le groupe et son fondateur, John Paulson, n'ont toutefois pas été mis en cause directement par la SEC.

Fabrice Tourre a affirmé que la transaction Abacus "n'était pas conçue pour échouer".

D'autres salariés et dirigeants de Goldman Sachs devaient être entendus par la commission sénatoriales, parmi lesquels le PDG Lloyd Blankfein.

Jonathan Stempel, Marc Angrand pour le service français, édité par Wilfrid Exbrayat

Below is the testimony that Daniel Sparks, the former head of Goldman Sachs' Mortgage Department, gave to the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations:



Chairman Levin, Dr. Coburn, and members of the Subcommittee.

My name is Dan Sparks, and from late 2006 until mid-2008, I was the head of the Mortgage Department at Goldman Sachs. The three men who are with me today -- Fabrice Tourre, Joshua Birnbaum, and Michael Swenson -- all reported up to me during that period.

I joined Goldman Sachs in 1989 as an analyst after graduating from college. My intention was to stay for two years, and I ended up staying for nineteen. I would not have stayed if the people I worked with did not have high ethical standards. The culture at Goldman Sachs was one in which excellence and integrity were expected.

The business of Goldman's Mortgage Department involved structuring, underwriting, distributing, and trading mortgage and assetbacked products, including loans, securities, and derivatives. All these activities involved clients, and all involved risk. The business was competitive, and Goldman participated without a significant residential mortgage origination platform.

I know that the Subcommittee is focusing on the events of late 2006 and 2007, so I will as well. Near the end of 2006, Goldman was generally long in its exposure to residential mortgages. I had concerns about our exposures and senior management knew about those concerns. The markets showed signs of stress, and our department was experiencing losses. In mid- December, David Viniar, Goldman's CFO, called a meeting and asked me to comprehensively review our positions and business risks. The "take-away" from the meeting was to reduce risk in the short term. I was not instructed to "go long" or "go short." The focus was on risk, not direction.

Risk management during this period was very challenging. In a volatile and illiquid market, we had to change business approaches constantly. We were diligent in marking our positions daily, as painful as that was on many days. That discipline gave us real-time feedback and helped us make important risk decisions. These included reducing our loan purchases, buying jump-risk protection, shutting down our CDO warehouse activities at significant losses, and covering our shorts.

Knowing whether we were long or short was often difficult, as our positions were complex and the market moved erratically. There were times when our analytical risk measures told us one thing, and my experience and knowledge of our positions told me something else. Some days, we took actions to reduce risk only to see the firm's Value at Risk or "VaR" increase.

During this time, there were differing views within the Mortgage Department, and around the firm, as to the direction of the residential mortgage markets. But the one constant theme from senior management was to reduce risk.

Throughout 2007, the Mortgage Department reacted to market events, worked with our clients, and managed our risk. I left Goldman Sachs in mid-2008 to spend more time with my family and in my community, and to pursue other interests. When I left, I was proud of what the people in the Mortgage Department had accomplished during a difficult period, and I remain so today. At the same time, I understand that events in the nation's mortgage market contributed to the financial crisis of 2008 and to the recession. I also understand that Congress has a duty to explore the causes of that crisis and to adopt sound reforms. To that end, I look forward to being helpful to you this morning.



The business of Goldman's Mortgage Department involved structuring, underwriting, distributing, and trading mortgage and assetbacked products, including loans, securities, and derivatives. All these activities involved clients, and all involved risk. The business was competitive, and Goldman participated without a significant residential mortgage origination platform.

I know that the Subcommittee is focusing on the events of late 2006 and 2007, so I will as well. Near the end of 2006, Goldman was generally long in its exposure to residential mortgages. I had concerns about our exposures and senior management knew about those concerns. The markets showed signs of stress, and our department was experiencing losses. In mid- December, David Viniar, Goldman's CFO, called a meeting and asked me to comprehensively review our positions and business risks. The "take-away" from the meeting was to reduce risk in the short term. I was not instructed to "go long" or "go short." The focus was on risk, not direction.

Risk management during this period was very challenging. In a volatile and illiquid market, we had to change business approaches constantly. We were diligent in marking our positions daily, as painful as that was on many days. That discipline gave us real-time feedback and helped us make important risk decisions. These included reducing our loan purchases, buying jump-risk protection, shutting down our CDO warehouse activities at significant losses, and covering our shorts.

Knowing whether we were long or short was often difficult, as our positions were complex and the market moved erratically. There were times when our analytical risk measures told us one thing, and my experience and knowledge of our positions told me something else. Some days, we took actions to reduce risk only to see the firm's Value at Risk or "VaR" increase.

During this time, there were differing views within the Mortgage Department, and around the firm, as to the direction of the residential mortgage markets. But the one constant theme from senior management was to reduce risk.

Throughout 2007, the Mortgage Department reacted to market events, worked with our clients, and managed our risk. I left Goldman Sachs in mid-2008 to spend more time with my family and in my community, and to pursue other interests. When I left, I was proud of what the people in the Mortgage Department had accomplished during a difficult period, and I remain so today. At the same time, I understand that events in the nation's mortgage market contributed to the financial crisis of 2008 and to the recession. I also understand that Congress has a duty to explore the causes of that crisis and to adopt sound reforms. To that end, I look forward to being helpful to you this morning.